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1 OPENING BRIEF 
> Priority No. 2 
) Lower Court No. 9417-250 
) Ct. App. No. 960755-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Count I: Failure to Stop at the Command of a Peace Officer, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1994); 
Count II: Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1994); Count III: Interference With a Peace 
Officer Making a Lawful Arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1994); Count IV: Escape, a Class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1994) ; 
Count V: Driving While on Suspension or Revocation in Another 
State, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-
3-227 (1994); and Count VI: Carrying a Concealed Weapon, a Class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1) (a) 
(1994) . 
This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was Castle placed in constitutional jeopardy when the 
first trial court sua sponte dismissed the jury and declared a 
mistrial because the court was displeased with the manner Castle, 
who was proceeding pro se, conducted cross-examination? 
A. Standard of Appellate Review 
This Court is reviewing the correctness of the trial court's 
denial of Castle's motion to dismiss or motion to arrest judgment, 
premised on the ground that he was placed in jeopardy after the 
trial court essentially acquitted him by dismissing the jury and 
declaring a mistrial. Thus, the issue presented raises a question 
of law and the trial court's decision is reviewed non-deferentially 
for correction of error. See State v. Arbon, 909 P. 2d 1270, 1271-
72 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); State 
v. Davis, 903 P. 2d 940, 942-43 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, 916 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). See generally State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (question of law reviewed for correctness); 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 & .3 (Utah 1991). 
2 
B. Preservation of Issue and Propriety of Review 
The issue was properly preserved in the court below. See 
Castle's pro se Motion to Dismiss, R. 172, 220. See also Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment and accompanying memorandum of law. R. 351-358. 
The trial court denied both motions forming the basis of this 
appeal. See R. 181, 241, 369; see also Addendum III. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules 
cited below here are reproduced verbatim at Addendum II: 
United States Constitution, Amendment V; United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV; Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 
12; Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-13.5, 41-6-46, 53-3-227, 76-1-403, 76-8-
305, 76-8-309, 76-10-504. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Castle was charged in a Six-Count Information filed September 
26, 1994, alleging various violation of the Utah Criminal and 
Traffic Codes (R.l-2). Castle thereafter filed various motions pro 
se, including a Motion to Dismiss Count 5, Driving on Suspension 
(R.24-48), and judicial notice demand for rights (R.67-68). 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
The district court denied all the motions (See, e.g., R.438). 
Castle then underwent a jury trial before the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson on July 17, 1995 (R.153, 431). 
At trial, Castle apparently became acrimonious with the court 
and counsel. The Court found Castle in contempt, excused the jury, 
and declared a mistrial (R.166; see also Addenda V & VII) . It then 
ordered Castle* sent forthwith to jail (R.166, 522; Addendum V) . 
Castle filed an objection, and the matter was then set for retrial 
over Castle's objection (R.172). 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
Castle was subsequently retried in absentia before the 
Honorable Scott N. Johansen, on March 20, 1996. He was found 
guilty as charged (R.334; Addendum IV). Thereafter, the court 
sentenced Castle to serve zero to five (0-5) years in prison on 
Count I. This sentence was stayed providing Castle serve six 
months in the San Juan County Jail and pay a fine of $ 1250 (R.369, 
43 0; see also Addendum I). 
D. Statement of the Facts 
On September 26, 1994, Sergeant Douglas B. Hall of the Utah 
Highway Patrol, came into contact with Castle on Highway 191 in Dry 
Valley, San Juan County, Utah (R.4 87). Sergeant Hall observed the 
car that Castle was driving and obtained a radar reading of his 
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traveling speed at 68 mph, which apparently was over the speed 
limit for the area (R.488) . Sergeant Hall then pulled Castle over 
for the driving violation. Castle pulled over in response, but 
refused to provide his driver's license. Shortly thereafter, 
Castle notified Sergeant Hall that he had a weapon in his 
possession, but refused to turn it over to the officer (R.492-93) . 
Castle also revealed that he had a warrant out for his arrest on a 
separate traffic matter (R.491). Castle refused to get out of the 
vehicle and left the scene, proceeding down the roadway towards 
Monticello (R.494). A roadblock was subsequently commenced, and 
Castle was apprehended and taken into custody (R.4 94-95) 
The State then charged Castle with various traffic and 
criminal charges in a six-count Information alleging, among others, 
failure to yield to a police officer's command to stop, a third 
degree felony (R.l-2). Castle attempted to have counsel of his own 
choosing, who, according to the record, appears not to have been a 
member of the Utah State Bar (Addendum VI, at 5 [docket sheet]). 
He also asked to have his own court reporter, who was apparently 
not appropriately certified in the State of Utah (R.438) . The 
court denied both requests {id,). 
After denying Castle's pro se pretrial motions, Judge 
Anderson impanelled a jury for trial (R.435-467). Castle presented 
an opening statement on his own behalf and attempted to raise 
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constitutional issues. He was admonished by the court (R.481-482). 
During the course of that colloquy, Castle referred to the district 
judge by his given name (R.482) . The court, once again, admonished 
Castle and told him that his opening statement was over, ordering 
Castle to sit down (R.486). 
The State then called its first witness, Sergeant Hall, who 
was examined by both parties (R.487, 510) . During the course of the 
cross-examination, the State interposed numerous objections, which 
were sustained by the court. A discussion subsequently ensued 
between the Court and Castle over the latitude of his cross-
examination. Eventually, the Court found Castle in contempt of 
court and, in the presence of the jury, summarily sentenced him to 
thirty (30) days in jail (R.522; Addenda V & VII). The jury was 
then excused and a mistrial sua sponte declared (R.522; Addendum 
VII) . 
Thereafter, Castle filed a Motion to Dismiss based on having 
been placed in jeopardy as a result of the aborted trial (R.172). 
The court denied the motion (R.169-70; Addendum III) . An order of 
contempt was signed by the court on July 20, 1995 (R.166-67), 
finding Castle in contempt for statements made during his opening 
statement and for ignoring instructions from the court. See 
Addendum V. 
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Castle later attempted to appeal the matter to this Court 
(R.243). However, this Court issued an order of dismissal and a 
remittitur (R. 274-75), on the ground that there was not a final 
appealable order under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(a) 
(Ru 275)-1 
The matter went back to the court below, and was set for a new 
trial before the Honorable Scott Johansen (R.265, 276). This time, 
Castle did not appear for trial (R.527), and was convicted in 
absentia, as charged in the Information (R.334, 614; see also 
Addendum IV). 
Subsequently, Castle hired present counsel, who filed a motion 
in arrest of judgement, and again raised the double jeopardy issue 
(R.351). The motion was denied, and Castle was sentenced to serve 
zero to five (0-5) years in prison, all of which was suspended 
except for six (6) months incarceration in the San Juan County 
Jail (R.369-70; Addendum I). 
A notice of appeal was thereafter timely filed with the court 
below (R.374). There are no prior or related appeals in this 
matter other than the pro se appeal filed by Castle, which was 
dismissed on this Court's own motion as not being an appealable 
final order (R.275). 
1
 But see State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979) 
(denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds is final appealable order). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court committed reversible error for denying 
Castle's pro se motion to dismiss and his motion to arrest 
judgment. Jeopardy clearly attached at the first trial when Judge 
Anderson dismissed the jury and sua sponte declared a mistrial 
because the court was displeased with Castle's cross-examination 
manner. No legal necessity justified the mistrial, particularly 
when the court provided the parties no reasonable opportunity to 
address whether mistrial was manifestly necessary, nor made on-the-
record findings to justify the mistrial. Rather than declaring a 
mistrial, the court could have warned Castle that his conduct could 
invite a mistrial and subject him to another trial on the same 
charges. 
Accordingly, Judge Anderson's decision to declare a mistrial 
was unnecessary and operated as an acquittal, precluding the State 
from retrying Castle for the same offense before Judge Johansen. 
Therefore Judge Anderson should have granted Castle's pnro se motion 
to dismiss. In the alternative, Judge Johansen should have granted 
the same motion or the motion to arrest judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CASTLE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PLACED IN JEOPARDY WHEN THE 
FIRST TRIAL COURT SUA SPONTE DISCHARGED THE JURY AND 
DECLARED A MISTRIAL BECAUSE THE COURT WAS DISPLEASED WITH 
THE MANNER IN WHICH CASTLE CONDUCTED CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
ACCORDINGLY, HE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO A 
SECOND TRIAL FOR THE SAME OFFENSES. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause provisions in the Federal and Utah 
Constitutions2 protect against three types of government 
overreaching: ua second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1897 (1989). 
See also Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 770, 
114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994); Davis, 903 P.2d at 943; State v. 
Miller, 747 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). It is the first 
prohibition that is implicated here. 
2
 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides "... nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." U.S. 
Const. Amend. V. Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
similarly provides ".... nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the similarity in the two 
provisions does not necessarily require similar analysis. See 
State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 n.18 (Utah 1990). However, 
the federal standard remains persuasive. See id. But see 
generally State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1979) 
(applying both state and federal standards without distinction). 
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In Ambrose, the Utah Supreme Court noted that " [t] he 
guarantees assures that, with certain exceptions, an individual 
will not be forced to endure the strain, embarrassment, anxiety and 
expense of a [second] criminal trial for the same offense." 
Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 357 (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 
651, 97 S.Ct. 2034 (1977)). According to Ambrose, "jeopardy 
attaches when the accused is put on trial in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, on a valid indictment (or information), and a jury 
has been sworn and impaneled." Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358 (citing 
State vs. Whitman, 74 P.2d 696 (1973); and State vs. Thompson, 199 
P. 161 (1921)) . 3 
Under manifestly necessary circumstances, even when jeopardy 
has attached, the court may terminate a trial without implicating 
the defendant's double jeopardy protections, such as when the 
defendant consents to discharging the jury or "legal necessity" 
requires the discharge. See Whitman, 74 P.2d at 697; Ambrose, 598 
P. 2d at 358 ("legal necessity" implies that "the court must refrain 
from prematurely discharging the jury unless it determines, after 
careful inquiry, that discharging the jury is the only reasonable 
alternative to insure justice under the circumstances."); State v. 
3
 Accord State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 
1983); State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); 
State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same). For 
example, in Whitman, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The court cannot arbitrarily discharge a jury, 
nor should it ever be discharged until it 
appears from the statements of the jurors, and 
the facts and circumstances of a the case, 
that every reasonable hope of agreement on a 
verdict has vanished; unless there is a 
breakdown in the judicial machinery which 
renders further orderly and systematic 
procedure impracticable, such as the illness 
of the court, or a juror, or the defendant, or 
in some cases counsel; or reasons which the 
law will recognize as an absolute necessity, 
or upon grounds provided by statute. 
Otherwise, the discharge operates as an 
acquittal. 
Whitman, 74 P.2d at 697 (emphasis supplied); accord Ambrose, 598 
P.2d at 359; Pearson, 818 P.2d at 584. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1994) also codifies the double 
jeopardy guarantees, providing in pertinent parts, with emphasis 
added: 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a 
subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(iii) was improperly terminated[.] 
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(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if 
the termination takes place before the verdict, is for 
reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place 
after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the 
defendant, or, if the jury is waived, after the first 
witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is 
not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination[.] 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the 
law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding 
not attributable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict 
reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state 
makes it impossible to proceed with the 
trial without injustice to the defendant 
or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a 
verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trial.4 
In Whitman, as here, the trial court discharged the jury and 
declared a mistrial because the court was incensed at the defense 
4
 In Nilson, this Court observed that Section 76-1-403(4) (c) 
codifies the so-called "legal necessity" requirements, which 
allow a court to terminate a trial without implicating the double 
jeopardy clause. See Nilson 854 P.2d at 1031 n. 3 
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counsel, who had taken "exception to the remarks and action of the 
court and asked that the record show the same. . .." Whitman, 74 
P. 2d at 697. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, 
holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing 
the jury and declaring a mistrial simply because it was "displeased 
with the conduct of counsel for defendant. . . . " Whitman, 74 P.2d 
at 697. The Supreme Court also noted that the trial court did not 
make any finding that discharging the jury was the only reasonable 
alternative to insure justice under the circumstances. See id. 
The Ambrose Court similarly approved the same test, stating, 
Mh]ere, as in State v. Whitman, the court was evidently in doubt 
as to ... the propriety of some comments, but the record does not 
reveal a determination that discharging the jury was the only 
reasonable alternative to insure justice under the circumstances." 
Ambrose, 598 P. 2d at 359. Ambrose further made clear that if the 
trial court exercises discretion in this area, it must make a 
record of its reasoning for doing so at the time of the discharge. 
"In Utah the trial court is required to make the exercise of its 
discretion in the situation a matter of record." Ambrose, 598 P.2d 
at 360. In Whitman, the Court quotes favorably State v. Reed, 53 
Kan. 767, 37 P. 174 (1894), which stated: 
. . . the question of the necessity for discharge was to be 
heard and determined by judicial methods, and such 
methods certainly contemplate that a record of the 
findings and determinations of the court should be made. 
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It results from the cases that before the court may 
discharge a jury to which has been submitted the question 
of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused 
there should exist, first, a legal necessity for such 
discharge; second, the court must make inquiry and find 
and determine that such necessity existed at the time of 
the discharge; and, third, the essential facts as to such 
necessity, and the findings of the court thereon, must be 
made a matter of record, or the defendant may 
successfully plead former jeopardy when placed on trial 
again on the same charge. 
Whitman, 74 P. 2d at 698 (quoting State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 37 P. 
174 (1894)). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(4)(c) (requiring 
the trial court to make findings and state it for the record). 
Nilson is also informative here. There, the State alleged 
that the defendant had sexually abused the victim in 1989. At 
trial, the State's main witness changed his testimony that the 
abuse had in fact occurred in 1990. Faced with this contradiction, 
the State moved to dismiss and refile the charges based on the new 
information provided by the witness. Defense counsel responded 
that he had no objection to the State's motion. Upon refiling, the 
defendant however successfully moved to quash on double jeopardy 
grounds. See Nilson, 854 P.2d at 1030. 
On appeal, the State contended that the defendant's statement 
that he had no objection to the dismissal demonstrated that he 
consented to the termination of the trial. This Court rejected 
that argument, holding that "failure to object or silence should 
not be construed as implied consent to a mistrial, particularly 
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wnen tne court acts abruptly and there is no opportunity to 
object." Id. at 1032 {citing Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 360) . This Court 
went on to find the defendant's response to the State's motion 
inadequate to constitute a consent to mistrial, and therefore the 
trial court properly granted his motion to quash. See id. 
Castle anticipates the State contending that Judge Anderson 
was legally justified in discharging the jury and declaring a 
mistrial because Castle repeatedly ignored the court's admonitions 
regarding the scope of cross-examination. See, e.g., R. 182 (trial 
court stating, "The declaration of a mistrial followed a citation 
of direct contempt against defendant. The reasons for the contempt 
citations are evident from the record and were thereafter detailed 
in the order entered by the court pursuant to Section 78-32-3, Utah 
Code (1995). Defendant not only ignored contemporaneous 
instructions from the court, but acted contrary to detailed 
instructions laid out for him by the court. . . . " ) . 
But the Supreme Court has held that a contemptuous act or 
similar conduct alone is insufficient to make the trial court sua 
sponte discharge a jury and declare a mistrial. The court is 
obligated to consider less drastic alternatives to a mistrial. See 
Ambrose, 598 P. 2d at 359. In Whitman, the Court specifically held 
that the fact that counsel's conduct may have been "reprehensible, 
if not contemptuous," was insufficient for the trial court to force 
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a mistrial on the defendant. See Whitman, 74 P. 2d at 697-98. 
Here, the court became incensed with Castle because he persisted in 
asking Sergeant Hall, during cross-examination, whether the 
relevant statute prohibited him from possessing a gun. See R. 359-
363. As a result of Castle's failure to adhere to admonition, the 
court found him in contempt: 
The Court: Mr. Castle, I find you in contempt of court. 
Do you have anything to say before I sentence 
you? 
Mr. Castle: I demand a jury trial on a contempt of court 
charge. 
The Court: All right. You are not entitled to a jury 
trial with that charge. I sentence you to 
thirty days in jail. Members of the jury, 
because this has happened, I'm forced to 
declare a mistrial in this case. I'm 
reluctant to do that because it means your 
effort here is wasted. 
R. 3 62; Addendum VII. 
Castle's conduct and remarks are no more reprehensible than 
counsel's conduct in Whitman, where the Supreme Court found 
mistrial legally unnecessary. See Whitman, 74 P. 2d at 696; see 
also Ambrose, 598 P. 2d at 359. Moreover, as in Whitman and 
Ambrose, it is apparent that the court consulted neither party 
prior to discharging the jury and declaring a mistrial. The record 
here is devoid of any discussion of "possible curative alternatives 
to a mistrial. Thus, [there is] no basis from which to conclude 
whether the court engaged in the 'scrupulous exercise of judicial 
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discretion7 required when dealing with the important rights here 
involved.'7 Ambrose, 598 P. 2d at 360. Clearly, had the court 
consulted with the parties and advised that a mistrial was 
imminent, Castle would have avoided that drastic sanction and 
properly conduct cross-examination as instructed. See, e.g., R. 
169, Addendum VIII (trial court stating that Castle has filed a 
statement with the court, after imposition of contempt sentence, 
pledging to abide by all court protocol). 
Nor did the court make the requisite statutory findings. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (4) (c) (requiring the court to make 
finding and to state for the record that termination of trial is 
necessary) ; see also Ambrose, 598 P. 2d at 3 60 ("the court must make 
inquiry and find and determine that such necessary necessity exists 
at the time of the discharge. . . and . . . the essential facts as 
to such necessity and findings of the court thereon, must be made 
a matter of record, or the defendant may successfully plead former 
jeopardy when placed on trial again on the same charge") (quoting 
Whitman, 74 P.2d at 696 and citing State v. Reed, 37 P. at 174). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
In summary, there is no doubt that jeopardy attached on July 
17, 1995, when a jury was impaneled before Judge Anderson and 
Castle was tried for the charges. The record is also clear that 
Judge Anderson sua sponte discharged the jury and declared a 
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mistrial because Castle was found in contempt for improperly 
conducting cross-examination. However, finding Castle's conduct 
contemptuous was alone insufficient to force a mistrial on him. 
Further, the court gave neither party opportunity to discuss less 
drastic, curative alternatives to a mistrial. Castle certainly did 
not consent to the mistrial. See Nilson, 854 P.2d at 1032. And the 
court made no contemporaneous finding as to the legal necessity 
justifying the mistrial. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Castle's 
motion to dismiss. Having been acquitted by Judge Anderson in the 
first trial, Castle should not have been subjected a second to 
trial before Judge Johansen. Based on the foregoing, Castle urges 
this Court to reverse his in absentia conviction on double jeopardy 
grounds and vacate his sentence. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is requested because of the important 
constitutional question involved. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 1997. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this 
day of May, 1997, to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General and J. 
Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals 
Division, Utah Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, and the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 
South 500 East, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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ADDENDUM I 
FINDINGS, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT ORDER 
(R.369, 430) 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
 1IA1I n r t tnnn 
San Juan County Attorney FILED NOV 2 0 1996 
P. 0 . BOX 850 CLERK QF THE COURT 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 B Y-———^nxR 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * FINDINGS, JUDGMENT 
vs. AND COMMITMENT 
DAVID CASTLE, * Criminal No. 9417-250 
Defendant(s). * 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 20TH 
day of NOVEMBER, 1996, before the above entitled Court, Craig C. 
Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and 
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Bradley Rich. 
The Defendant agreeing to the arrangements made by counsel, 
and waiving the minimum 2-day time period for sentencing, Defendant 
having been found guilty by jury trial to charges: 
COUNT No. 1: FAILURE TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A POLICE 
OFFICER, A FELONY 3RD DEGREE. 
COUNT No. 2: SPEEDING, CLASS C MISDEMEANOR 
COUNT No. 3: INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING A LAWFUL 
ARREST, CLASS B MISDEMEANOR. 
COUNT No. 4: ESCAPE, CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
COUNT No. 5: DRIVING WHILE ON SUSPENSION: CLASS C MISDEMEANOR 
COUNT No. 6: CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON: CLASS B MISDEMANOR 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve 
a term not to exceed FIVE (5) years on Count No. 1, this sentence 
is stayed upon the following conditions: 
1. Defendant serve 6 months in the San Juan County Jail. 
Credit for time already served. 
2. Defendant pay a fine in the sum of $1250.00. 
Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into 
custody and deliver him forthwith to the San Juan County Jail. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and 
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that 
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other 
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the 
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into 
custody, detaining, and delivering said Defendant. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Ml 
Judge Scott Johansen 
District Court 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
jSan Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
FILED MAR - 5 1997 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY-
DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE, 
Defendant(s). 
2ND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
* AND ORDER 
Criminal No. 9417-250 
Pursuant to the foregoing Motion, it is hereby Ordered that 
the above named Defendant, David Castle, be committed to the San 
Juan County Jail to continue serving the original sentence as 
ordered in the Judgment and Commitment issued November 20th, 1996 
by this Court. 
All terms of the original order are still in effect^^—~-^3?3^ 
Dated this -2&feh day of _EeJbruA£y, 1997. -
By the Court: 
fa'- IT- -
• * & * • $ 
V v i l f e ^ ^ 
Jud^e Scott Johansen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
of the foregoing Motion and Order was mailed to 
Rich, Attorney for Defendant, arid a copy given to 
the San Juan County Jail, this -SfSday of 
clertf X 
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ADDENDUM II 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Art. IV, § 4 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 558 
AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIII 
[Religions and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT HI 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
,4 AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to he confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XH 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per-
sons voted for. as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi-
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,^  
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.' 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a -
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon! 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then thej 
Vice-President shaft act as President, as in the case of the] 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—Thef 
person having the greatest number of votes as "Vice-President,! 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the| 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have aj 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the! 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum forthel 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of! 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall bej 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible] 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Viee|j 
President of the United States. 
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^AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in &ny way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
J- The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United Slates or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVII 
[Election of senators.] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVUI 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION L] 
Section 
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.] 
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Time limit for adoption.] 
Section 1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating li-
quors.] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 564 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd as.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive tines snail not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital 
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases 
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of 
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
[Trial by jury.] [Proposed.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. [1996] 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to domand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by tlio 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to huve a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. ww 
Sec. IS. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to tho somo ovort act. 18M 
See. 20. [Military subordinate to tho civil power.] 
Tho military slwill bo in strict subordination to tho civil 
power, and no soldier in time of poaco, shall bo quartered in 
any houso without the consent of tho owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. MM 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forblddon.] "r 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof tho party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 18M 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. l&M 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,-
privilege or immunity. 1M* 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
1 8 * 
639 MOTOR VEHICLES 41-6-13.5 
so that some part of its weight and that of its load 
rests upon or is carried by another vehicle. 
(41) "Shoulder area" means that area of the 
hard-surfaced highway separated from the road-
way by a pavement edge line as established in 
the current approved "Manual on Uniform Traf-
fic Control Devices," or that portion of the road 
contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of 
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral 
support. 
(42) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street 
between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a 
roadway, and the adjacent property lines in-
tended for the use of pedestrians. 
(43) "Solid rubber tire" means every tire of 
rubber or other resilient material which does not 
depend upon compressed air for the support of 
the load. 
(44) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting 
of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than 
temporarily for the purpose of and while actually 
engaged in receiving or discharging passengers. 
(45) "Stop" when required means complete ces-
sation from movement. 
(46) "Stop" or "stopping" when prohibited 
means any halting even momentarily of a vehi-
cle, whether occupied or not, except when neces-
sary to avoid conflict with other traffic or when 
in compliance with the directions of a peace offi-
cer or official traffic-control device. 
(47) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or 
herded animals, vehicles, and other conveyances 
either singly or together while using any high-
way for the purpose of travel. 
(48) "Traffic-control signal" means any device, 
whether manually, electrically, or mechanically 
operated, by which traffic is alternately directed 
to stop and permitted to proceed. 
(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or 
without motive power, other than a pole trailer, 
designed for carrying persons or property and for 
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed 
so that no part of its weight rests upon the tow-
ing vehicle. 
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle de-
signed, used, or maintained primarily for the 
transportation of property. 
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle de-
signed and used primarily for drawing other ve-
hicles and constructed to carry a part of the 
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck 
tractor. 
(52) "Urban district" means the territory con-
tiguous to and including any street, in which 
structures devoted to business, industry, or 
dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less 
than 100 feet, for a distance of a quarter of a mile 
or more. 
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or 
by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a highway, except de-
vices used exclusively upon stationary rails or 
tracks. 1987 
11-6-1.5. Private vehicle as emergency vehicle 
— Rules . 
The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety may make rules, consistent with this chapter, 
governing the use, in emergencies, of signal lights on 
privately-owned vehicles. The rules may include a 
rule allowing privately-owned vehicles to be desig-
nated for part-time emergency use. 1987 
41-6-2 to 41-6-10. Repealed. 1979 
ARTICLE 2 
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC 
REGULATIONS 
41-6-11. Chapter relates to vehicles on high-
ways — Exceptions. 
The provisions of this chapter relating to the opera-
tion of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of 
vehicles upon highways, except: 
(1) where a different place is specifically re-
ferred to in a given section; or 
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5 
and Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which 
apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout 
the state. 1987 
41-6-12. Violations of chapter — Penalt ies . 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a 
class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided. 
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11, 
15, and 17 of this chapter is an infraction, unless 
otherwise provided. 1993 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other 
traffic controllers. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to com-
ply with any lawful order or direction of any peace 
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing 
guard invested by law with authority to direct, con-
trol, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or 
maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use 
devices and procedures conforming to the latest edi-
tion of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control De-
vices for Streets and Highways." 1987 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal 
to stop — Fleeing — Causing property 
damage or bodily injury — Suspens ion 
of driver's l icense — Forfeiture of vehi-
cle — Penalt ies . 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or 
audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle 
to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or en-
danger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who 
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or 
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this 
subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and 
while so doing causes death or serious bodily injury to 
another person, under circumstances not amounting 
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony 
of the second degree. The court shall, as part of any 
sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not 
less than $5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under 
this section or any other section, an operator 
who, having received a visual or audible signal 
from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, 
operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disre-
gard of the signal so as to interfere with or en-
danger the operation of any vehicle or person, or 
who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's 
license revoked pursuant to Subsection 
41-2-127(l)(h) [53-3-220(l)(h)J for a period of one 
year. 
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(b) state that the registered owner is responsi-
ble for payment of towing, impound, and storage 
fees charged against the vehicle; and 
(c) inform the registered owner of the vehicle 
of the conditions under Subsection (5) that must 
be satisfied before the vehicle is released. 
(5) (a) The impounded vehicle shall be released af-
ter the registered owner or the owner's agent: 
(i) makes a claim in person for release of 
the vehicle at any office of the State Tax 
Commission; 
(ii) pays an administrative impound fee of 
$25; 
(iii) presents identification sufficient to 
prove ownership of the impounded vehicle; 
and 
(iv) pays all towing and storage fees to the 
impound lot where the vehicle is stored, 
(b) All impound fees assessed under this sub-
section are dedicated credits to the Motor Vehicle 
Division. 
(6) An impounded vehicle not claimed by the regis-
tered owner or the owner's agent within the time pre-
scribed by Section 41-la-1103 shall be sold in accor-
dance with that section and the proceeds, if any, dis-
posed of under Section 41-la-1103. The date of im-
poundment is considered the date of seizure for com-
puting the time period provided in Section 
41-la-1103. 
(7) The registered owner of the vehicle upon the 
payment of all fees and charges incurred in the sei-
zure and impoundment of the owner's vehicle has a 
cause of action for all the fees and charges, together 
with damages, court costs, and attorney fees, against 
the operator of the vehicle whose actions caused the 
impoundment. 
(8) Liability may not be imposed upon any peace 
officer, the state, or any of its political subdivisions on 
account of the enforcement of this section. 1992 
41-6-45. Reckless driving — Penalty. 
(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property 
is guilty of reckless driving. 
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a first conviction, the 
penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not 
fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less 
than $25. On a second or subsequent conviction, the 
penalty is a minimum term of imprisonment of not 
fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less 
than $50. 1987 
ARTICLE 6 I 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS j 
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appro- [ 
priate speeds at certain locations — I 
Prima facie speed limits — Emergency > 
power of the governor. I 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed I 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the ex- [ 
isting conditions, giving regard to the actual and po- I 
tential hazards then existing, including when: I 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection I 
or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; ) 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding I 
roadway; and i 
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, 
other traffic, weather, or highway conditions. 
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Sub-
section (4) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the fol-
lowing speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school 
zone as defined in Section 41-6-20.1; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; 
(c) 65 miles per hour on highways where this 
speed limit does not impair the ability of the 
state to qualify for federal highway funds; and 
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any 
speed in excess of the limits provided in Subsection 
(2) is prima facie evidence that the speed is not rea-
sonable or prudent and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or 
emergency may change the speed limits on the high-
ways of the state. 1994 
41-6-47. Prima facie speed limit. 
(1) (a) When the Department of Transportation de-
termines upon the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that any prima facie speed 
under this article is not reasonable or safe under 
the existing conditions at any intersection or 
other place or on a state highway, the Depart-
ment of Transportation may determine a reason-
able and safe prima facie speed limit. 
(b) When changing a speed limit, the Depart-
ment of Transportation shall consult with local 
political units prior to erecting or changing any 
signs within local political boundaries. 
(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate 
signs giving notice are erected a t the intersection or 
other place or part of the highway. 1988 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions — Powers of local 
authorities — Posted speed. 
(1) When local authorities in their respective juris-
dictions determine on the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that the prima facie speed per-
mitted under this article is not reasonable and safe 
under the conditions found to exist upon a highway or 
part of a highway, the local authority may determine 
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit which: 
(a) decreases the limit at intersections; 
(b) increases the limit within an urban dis-
trict; or 
(c) decreases the limit outside an urban dis-
trict, but not to less than 35 miles per hour. 
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdic-
tions shall determine by an engineering and traffic 
investigation the prima facie speed for all highways 
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare 
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be 
different than the prima facie speed permitted under 
this chapter for an urban district. 
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective 
when appropriate signs giving notice are erected 
upon the highway. 
(4) The Department of Transportation determines 
prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state high-
ways whether the highways are within or without the 
corporate limits of any city. 1987 
41-6-48.5. Maximum speed in a school zone — 
Penalty — Minimum fines — Commu-
nity service — Recordkeeping. 
( D A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed 
greater than 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed 
school zone as defined in Section 41-6-20.1. 
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(ii) Section 53-3-221, for failing to comply 
with the terms of a traffic citation. 
(c) (i) The length of the revocation required by 
Subsection 53-3-220(l)(a)(xi), (a)(xii), (b)(i), 
or (b)(ii) shall be specified in an order of the 
court adjudicating or convicting the person 
of the offense. 
(ii) If the person adjudicated of the offense 
is younger than 16 years of age, the license 
or driving privilege shall be revoked for a 
minimum of one year, from age 16, but not to 
exceed the date the person turns 21 years of 
age. 
(iii) If the person adjudicated or convicted 
of the offense is 16 years of age or older, the 
license or driving privilege shall be revoked 
for a minimum of one year, but not to exceed 
five years. 
(d) A revoked license may not be renewed. 
(e) Application for a new license shall be filed 
in accordance with Section 53-3-205. 
(0 The new license is subject to all provisions 
of an original license. 
(g) The division may not grant the license 
until an investigation of the character, driving 
abilities, and habits of the driver has been made 
to indicate whether it is safe to grant him a li-
cense. 
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose license to 
drive a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended 
or revoked under this chapter may not drive a motor 
vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or regis-
tration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or 
other source during suspension or after revocation 
until a new license is obtained under this chapter. 
1993 (2nd S.S.) 
53-3-226. Grounds for confiscation of licenses, 
plates, and other articles issued by 
state — Additional fee for reinstate-
ment. 
(1) (a) The division, any peace officer acting in his 
official capacity, or a person authorized under 
Subsection (2) may take possession of any certifi-
cate of title, registration card, decal, permit, li-
cense certificate, registration plate, or any other 
article issued by the state: 
(i) upon expiration, denial, suspension, 
disqualification, revocation, alteration, or 
cancellation of it; 
(ii) tha t is fictitious; 
(iii) tha t has been unlawfully or errone-
ously issued; or 
(iv) tha t is unlawfully or erroneously dis-
played. 
(b) A receipt shall be issued tha t describes 
each confiscated item. 
(2) The division may enter into contractual agree-
ments with constables or other law enforcement 
agencies to facilitate confiscation of items listed in 
Subsection (1) if a person fails or refuses to surrender 
any of those documents to the division upon demand. 
(3) The division shall assess against a person mak-
ing an application referred to in Subsection 
53-3-205(14), in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under Section 
53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's driv-
ing privilege is reinstated, to cover the costs required 
to serve orders related to the purposes of Subsection 
(2). 1993 
53-3-227. Driving a motor vehicle prohibited 
while license denied, suspended, dis-
qualified, or revoked — Penalties. 
(1) A person whose license has been denied, sus-
pended, disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or 
under the laws of the state in which his license was 
issued and who drives any motor vehicle upon the 
highways of this s tate while tha t license is denied, 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished 
as provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(1), other than a violation specified in Subsection (3), 
is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
whose conviction under Subsection (1) is based on 
his driving a motor vehicle while his license is 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test 
under Section 41-6-44.10; 
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance tha t 
complies with the requirements of Section 
41-6-43; 
(iv) a violation of Section 41-6-44.6; 
(v) a violation of Section 76-5-207; 
(vi) a criminal action tha t the person 
plead guilty to as a result of a plea bargain 
after having been originally charged with vi-
olating one or more of the sections or ordi-
nances under this subsection; 
(vii) a revocation or suspension which has 
been extended under Subsection 53-3-220 
(2); or 
(viii) where disqualification is the result 
of driving a commercial motor vehicle while 
the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended, 
canceled, or revoked under Subsection 
53-3-414(1). 
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
whose conviction under Subsection (1) is based 
upon his driving a motor vehicle while his license 
is suspended, disqualified, or revoked in his state 
of licensure for violations corresponding to the 
violations listed in Subsection (a). ' 
(c) A fine imposed under this subsection shall 
be at least the maximum fine for a class C misde-
meanor under Section 76-3-301. 1994 
53-3-228. Making false affidavit is perjury. 
A person who makes any false affidavit or know-
ingly swears or affirms falsely, to any mat ter or thing 
required under this chapter to be sworn to or af-
firmed, is guilty of perjury. 1993 
53-3-229. Prohibited uses of license certificate 
— Penalty. 
It is a class C misdemeanor for a person to: 
(1) display, cause or permit to be displayed, or 
to have in possession any license certificate 
knowing it is fictitious or has been canceled, de-
nied, revoked, suspended, disqualified, or altered; 
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a li-
cense certificate issued to him, by a person not 
entitled to it; 
(3) display or to represent as his own a license 
certificate not issued to him; 
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division 
upon demand any license certificate that has 
been denied, suspended, disqualified, canceled, or 
revoked; 
(5) use a false name or give a false address in 
any application for a license or any renewal or 
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viction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of 
that included offense, the verdict or judgment of con-
viction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the 
defendant. 1974 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subse-
quent prosecution for offense out of 
same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or 
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, 
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an of-
fense that was or should have been tried under 
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; 
and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that nec-
essarily required a determination inconsis-
tent with a fact that must be established to 
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecu-
tion. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted 
in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a 
determination that there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser 
included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense 
even though the conviction for the lesser included 
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va-
cated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted 
in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of 
supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by 
the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecu-
tion if the termination takes place before the verdict, 
is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and 
takes place after a jury has been impanelled and 
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is 
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, ter-
mination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; 
or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to 
the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record 
that the termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceed-
ing not attributable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict 
reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state 
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial 
without injustice to the defendant or the 
state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a 
verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trial. 1974 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdict ion — Prosecu-
tion in other jurisdict ion barring pros-
ecution in state. 
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission 
of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal 
or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a 
bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the 
former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, convic-
tion, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are 
defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — 
Circumstances. 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not 
be barred under the following circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by 
the defendant without the knowledge of the pros-
ecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prose-
cution and with intent to avoid the sentence that 
might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judg-
ment of guilt held invalid in a subsequent pro-
ceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or 
similar collateral a t tack. 1973 
PART 5 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Ele-
ment of the offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is pre-
sumed to be innocent until each element of the of-
fense charged against him is proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or for-
bidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 1973 
76-1-502. Negat ing defense by al legat ion or 
proof — When not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negat ing a de-
fense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indict-
ment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a 
result of evidence presented at trial, either 
by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, 
and the defendant has presented evidence of 
such affirmative defense. 1973 
76-1-503. Presumpt ion of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this 
code or other penal s ta tu te has the following conse-
quences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the 
presumption exist, the issue of the existence of 
the presumed fact must be submitted to the ju ry 
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76-8-303. Prevention of Legislature or public 
servants from meeting or organizing. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if 
he intentionally and by force or fraud: 
(1) Prevents the Legislature, or either of the 
houses composing it, or any of the members 
thereof, from meeting or organizing; or 
(2) Prevents any other public servant from 
meeting or organizing to perform a lawful gov-
ernmental function. 1973 
76-8-304. Disturbing Legislature or official 
meeting. 
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if 
he intentionally: 
(a) disturbs the Legislature, or either of the 
houses composing it, while in session; 
(b) commits any disorderly conduct in the im-
mediate view and presence of either house of the 
Legislature, tending to interrupt its proceedings 
or impair the respect of its authority; or 
(c) disturbs an official meeting or commits any 
disorderly conduct in immediate view and pres-
ence of participants in an official meeting tend-
ing to interrupt its proceedings. 
(2) "Official meeting," as used in this section, 
means any lawful meeting of public servants for the 
purposes of carrying on governmental functions. 1992 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care 
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seek-
ing to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that per-
son or another and interferes with the arrest or de-
tention by: ^ 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform 
any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or deten-
tion; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the 
arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's 
refusal to refrain from performing any *act that 
would impede the arrest or detention. 1990 
76-8-306. Obstructing justice. 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to 
hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for 
the commission of a crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been committed, 
conceals it from a magistrate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transporta-
tion, disguise, or other means for avoiding discov-
ery or apprehension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery 
or apprehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical 
evidence that might aid in the discovery, appre-
hension, or conviction of the person; 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or decep-
tion anyone from performing an act that might 
aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, 
or conviction of the person; or 
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement 
officer has been authorized or has applied for au-
thorization under either Section 77-23a-10 or 
77-23a-15 to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral 
communication, gives notice or attempts to give 
notice of the possible interception to any person. 
I (2) An offense under Subsections (l)(a) through (f) 
I is a class B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows that 
I the offender committed a capital offense or a felony o f 
I the first degree, in which case the offense is a second 
I degree felony. 
I (3) An offense under Subsection (l)(g) is a third 
I degree felony. 
I (4) Subsection (1)(0 does not appfy to an act 
I against a juror. Obstructing the function of a juror is 
[ addressed in Section 76-8-508.5. iwi 
I 76-8-307. Failure to aid peace officer. 
I A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, upon 
I command by a peace officer identifiable or identified 
I by him as such, he unreasonably fails or refuses to 
I aid the peace officer in effecting an arrest or in pre-
I venting the commission of any offense by another 
I person. l f l73 
I 76-8-308. Acceptance of bribe or bribery to pre-
I vent criminal prosecution — Defense. 
I ( D A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if 
I h e : 
• (a) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any 
I benefit as consideration for his refraining from 
I initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution; or 
I (b) confers, offers, or agrees to confer any bene-
I fit upon another as consideration for the person 
I refraining from initiating or aiding in a criminal 
I prosecution. 
I (2) It is an affirmative defense that the value of the 
i benefit did not exceed an amount which the actor 
I believed to be due as restitution or indemnification 
I for the loss caused or to be caused by the offense. 1991 
I 76-8-309. Escape — Term for escape from state 
I prison. 
I (1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from 
I official custody. 
I (2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if: 
I (a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly 
I weapon against any person to effect the escape; 
I or . 
I (b) The actor escapes from confinement in the 
I state prison. Otherwise, escape is a class B mis-
I demeanor. 
I (3) "Official custody," for the purpose of this sec-
I tion, means arrest, custody in a penal institution, jail, 
I an institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, 
I or other confinement pursuant to an order of the 
I court. For purposes of this section a person is deemed 
I to be confined in the Utah state prison if he has been 
I sentenced and committed and the sentence has not 
I been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on 
I parole. 
I (4) The term imposed upon a person escaping con-
I finement in the state prison shall commence from the 
I time the actor would otherwise have been discharged 
I from the prison on the term or terms which he was 
I serving. 197S 
I 76-8-310. Aiding escape . 
I (1) A person is guilty of an offense if: 
[ (a) He aids another person to escape from offi-
( cial custody; or 
I (b) He knowingly provides a person in official 
J custody with anything which may facilitate such 
I person's escape; or 
j (c) Being a person in official custody, he know-
| ingly procures, makes, or possesses anything 
I which may facilitate escape. 
I (2) An offense under this section is a felony of the 
I second degree if: 
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an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the 
firing position. 
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be 
loaded when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or pro-
jectile is in a position whereby the manual operation 
of any mechanism once would cause the unexpended 
cartridge, shell, or projectile to be fired. 
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be 
loaded when it is capped or primed and has a powder 
charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 1990 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous 
weapon/handgun — Persons not per-
mitted to have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any 
crime of violence under the laws of the United 
States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any 
narcotic drug, or who has been declared mentally 
incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any danger-
ous weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dan-
gerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun, 
he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation 
for a felony may not have in his possession or 
under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a third degree felony, but if the danger-
ous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or 
transfer any handgun described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense 
under the laws of the United States, this 
state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined 
in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally de-
fective, as provided in the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been 
committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlaw-
fully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed 
Forces under dishonorable conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citi-
zen of the United States, has renounced such 
citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 1994 
76-10-504. Carrying concea led dangerous weap-
on. 
(1) Any person, except those persons described in 
Section 76-10-503 and those persons exempted under 
Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, except that a firearm that contains no 
ammunition and is enclosed in a case, gun box, or 
securely-tied package shall not be considered a con-
cealed weapon, but: 
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and 
contains no ammunition, he shall be guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor; 
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and 
contains ammunition, he shall be guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor; or 
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off 
shotgun, or if the dangerous weapon is a firearm 
and is used to commit a crime of violence, he 
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any per-
son, except persons described in Section 76-10-503, 
from keeping within his place of residence, place of 
business, or any vehicle under his control any fire-
arm, except that it shall be a class B misdemeanor to 
carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle. 1982 
76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle, 
on street, or in prohibited area. 
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person 
may not carry a loaded firearm: 
(a) in or on a vehicle; 
(b) on any public street; or 
(c) in a posted prohibited area. 
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misde-
meanor. 1990 
76-10-505.5. Possession of a dangerous weapon, 
firearm, or sawed-off shotgun on or 
about school premises — Penalty. 
(1) A person may not possess any dangerous 
weapon, firearm, or sawed-off shotgun at a place that 
the person knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, 
is on or about school premises. 
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or 
about school premises is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed-off shot-
gun on or about school premises is a class A mis-
demeanor. 
(3) This section applies to any person, except per-
sons authorized to possess a firearm as provided un-
der Sections 53-5-704, 53-5-705, 53A-3-502, 76-10-
510, 76-10-511, 76-10-523, and Subsection 76-10-
504(2) and as otherwise authorized by law. 
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a 
more serious weapons offense that may occur on or 
about school premises. 1993 
76-10-506. Threatening with or us ing dangerous 
w e a p o n in fight or quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in 
Section 76-10-503, who, not in necessary self defense 
in the presence of two or more persons, draws or ex-
hibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threat-
ening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any 
fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
1992 
76-10-507. Possession of deadly weapon with in-
tent to assault. 
Every person having upon his person any danger-
ous weapon with intent to unlawfully assault another 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1973 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, 
near highway, or in direction of any 
person, building, or vehicle. 
(1) A person may not discharge any kind of fire-
arm: 
(a) from an automobile or other vehicle; or 
(b) from, upon, or across any highway. 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a 
class B misdemeanor unless the actor discharges a 
firearm under any of the following circumstances not 
amounting to criminal homicide or attempted crimi-
nal homicide, in which case it is a third degree felony: 
ADDENDUM III 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
(R.181) 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COUfii 
San Juan County 
F/LED OCT 1 3 1995 
CLERK OF rHECOURV 
8V 
DEPUTY • 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CASTLE, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 9417-250 
Defendant has moved to dismiss on the authority of State v. 
Ambrose. 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979). The state has objected and 
filed a memorandum supporting its objection. 
Ambrose is a 3-2 decision of the Utah Supreme Court, and may 
accordingly be considered as close to the margin of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence. Ambrose involved prosecutorial misconduct for 
arguing — in the presence of the jury — that the considerable 
expense incurred by the state, the county and the defendant 
warranted further efforts to reach a verdict.1 
Because the court abruptly declared a mistrial after defense 
counsel claimed error on the prosecutor's comments, a majority of 
the Utah Supreme Court held that retrial of defendant would violate 
his double jeopardy rights. 
*It is interesting that many verdict urging instructions in current use allow the judge to 
point out to jurors the considerable investment involved in submitting a case for deliberation. 
This is not a case where the mistrial resulted from 
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, nor where the reasons for the 
mistrial are unclear. The declaration of a mistrial followed a 
citation of direct contempt against defendant. The reasons for the 
contempt citations are evident from the record and were thereafter 
detailed in the order entered by the court pursuant to Section 78-
32-3, Utah code (1995). Defendant not only ignored contemporaneous 
instructions from the court, but acted contrary to detailed 
instructions laid out for him by the court on April 20, 1995, when 
the trial date was selected. 
The misconduct of defendant alone was sufficient to create a 
substantial likelihood that jurors would be diverted from their 
fact finding role, become confused about the law, and incline to 
decide the case based upon an emotional reaction to the courtroom 
spectacle created by defendant. Under those circumstances, neither 
the defendant nor the state could receive a fair trial. The 
mistrial was therefore necessitated by intentional and contemptuous 
conduct of defendant that deprived the state of its right to a fair 
trial. Under those circumstances, the constitutional double 
jeopardy bar is not invoked. 
The motion to dismiss is denied. This matter will proceed to 
trial on October 27, 1995. 
The court once again encourages defendant to reconsider his 
decision to refuse licensed, appointed or standby counsel and 
reminds defendant of the conditions set forth in the order 
suspending the last ten days of defendant's sentence for contempt 
of court. Defendant is ordered to comply with those conditions. 
DATED the day of October, 1995. 
Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON 
MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, UT 84535 
David Castle 
6101 Menaul N.E. 
Albuquerque, NM 87117 
i Ji'«5»SJ3 
SB District! Court Clerk 
ADDENDUM IV 
VERDICT (R.334) 
^ ;ffi2H996 
ajp-rr.,... — 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County-
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF DTAH# 
Plaintiff, 
Vt3 , 
P/WID CASThK, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
I .Li N 1 1 7 ,!'>() 
We, the Jurors in the above case, find the defendant David Castle, 
Guilty Not Guilty 
Failure To Stop At The Command Of A Police Officer 
Speeding 
\ / 
^ 
i / 
Interference With A Peace Officer Making A Lawful 
Arrest 
Escape 
Driving While On Suspension Or Revocation In Another 
State 
Carrying A Concealed Weapon 
DATED this 3*0 day of ///^M.-^, , A.D., 1996 
-o 
IT 
Filed 
Foreman 
,1996 
C.A J C \ \ < A A V \ ^ C V r f c . / Deputy Clerk 
ff 
ADDENDUM V 
ORDER OF CONTEMPT 
(R.166) 
San .lu^.n County 
RIFO JUL 2 0 1895 
JJLnRKOFTHSCOUm 
KY _ . ., 
"' " r'^p;!r' 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OP CONTEMPT 
Case No. 9417-250 
Th :i s ::>i:clei: i s made I i» S t l e 
(1995), During his trial on July 17, 1995, David Elliott Castle 
committed acts contemptuous of the authority of the court by: 
1. Ignoring rulings of the court on evidentiary matters and 
persisting with questions after several rulings from the court that 
the matters were irrelevant and instructions to stop ask :i ng the 
questions. 
2. Stating during opening statements to the jury that he 
held the court in nothing but contempt. 
3. Ignoring instructions from the presiding judge to refer 
to the judge as Judge Anderson or your honor, and using instead the 
given name of the ji idge. 
4. Arguing with the judge after having been told repeatedly 
that the ruling was final and that he should proceed with his next 
1 
line of questions. 
5. Making comments to members of the jury after the court 
had ruled on a disputed matter. 
The foregoing acts of David Elliott Castle constitute 
disorderly, contemptuous and insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of the 
trial, and disobedience of a lawful order of the court committed in 
the immediate view and presence of the court. Defendant was 
accordingly, summarily found in contempt of court, and after having 
declined his right to speak before sentence was imposed, sentenced 
to 30 days in the San Juan County Jail pursuant to Sections 78-32-
10, Utah code (1995). 
A commitment was thereupon issued placing defendant in the 
custody of the San Juan County Sheriff to serve out the sentence. 
DATED the of July, 1995. 
2 
C E R T I F I C A T E O P !"» I ' nil II ,„ I  INN! 
I l u e t f . i l i ••• • ' • " ^  M - I I m a i l e d or Land de Livered tune dial 
c o r r e c t c o p i e s t h e f o r e g o i n g ORDER OF CONTEMPT, t o t h e 
f o l l o w i n g : 
Craig C, Halls David Elliott Castle 
San Juan County Attorney San Juan County Jail 
PO Box 850 297 South Main 
Monticello, UT 8453 5 Monticello, UT 84 53 5 
DATED the day of July, 1995. 
3 
ADDENDUM VI 
DISTRICT COURT DOCKET SHEET 
7TH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO COURT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH VS. DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE 
CASE NUMBER 94.1700250 State Felony March 13, 1997 
CHARGES 
Charge FAIL TO STOP/RESP AT COMMAND OF POLICE - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury 
Charge 2 - SPEEDING - Class C Misdemeanor 
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury 
Charge 3 - INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor 
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury 
Charge 4 - ESCAPE FROM OFFICIAL CUSTODY - Class B Misdemeanor 
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury 
Charge 5 - DRIVE ON DENIED LICENSE (amended) - Class C 
Misdemeanor 
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury 
Charge 6 - CARRYING CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON Class B 
Misdemeanor 
Disposition: March 20, 1996 Guilty - Jury 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: CRAIG C. HALLS 
Defendant - DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE 
6101 MENAUL BLVD NE 
ALBUQUERQUE, NM 87110 
Represented by: BRADLEY P. RICH 
Payor - PAULA CASTLE 
11101 KIELICH AVE NORTH EAST 
ALBUQUERQUE, UT 87111 
Payor - DAVID CASTLE 
6101 MENAUL BLVD NE 
ALBUQUERQUE, NM 87110 
Payee - SEVENTH DISTRICT ' 
Payor - BRADLEY RICH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE 
Date of Birth: December 25, 1942 
Social Security Number: 
Driver License Number: 0 
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Case No: 941700250 
Date: Mar. 13, 1997 
Driver License State: UT 
Law Enforcement Agency: Utah Highway Patrol 
Prosecuting Agency: SAN JUAN COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 
Arrest Date: September 26, 1994 
Violation Date: September 26, 1994 
CASE NOTE 
****RELEASED ON $7000.00 CASH BAIL**** 
PROCEEDINGS 
09-26-94 Bail paid in 
09-26-94 Judge JOHANSEN assigned. convert 
09-26-94 Bail Posted Payment Received: 7,000.00 ilas 
09-26-94 FLD: INFORMATION ilas 
09-26-94 ARRAIGNMENT FELONY scheduled on October 20, 1994 at 10:00 AM in 
COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. ilas 
09-26-94 FLD:HABEAS CORPUS ilas 
09-27-94 FLD: RELEASE WITH NOTICE TO APPEAR WITH INMATE RELEASE FORM ilas 
10-20-94 FLD: AMENDED INFORMATION ilas 
10-20-94 Charge 53-3-203 Sev MC was amended to 53-3-227 Sev MC ilas 
10-20-94 Fel Arraignment JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON ilas 
10-20-94 Judge ANDERSON assigned. ilas 
10-20-94 TAPE: 94-108 COUNT: 1045 ilas 
10-20-94 ATD: Deft pro se PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C. ilas 
10-20-94 Deft is present and pro se ilas 
10-20-94 Deft advised of rights ilas 
10-20-94 Information was read in court ilas 
10-20-94 PRE scheduled for 12/01/94 at 0130 P in room A with LRAilas 
10-20-94 Bail Amount ordered: 7000.00 ilas 
10-20-94 THE DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A COPY OF THE INFORMATION. THE NATURE ilas 
10-20-94 OF THE CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW WERE EXPLAIN-ilas 
10-20-94 ED. THE DEFENDANT STATED THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THE THINGS THE ilas 
10-20-94 COURT EXPLAINED. THE COURT EXPLAINED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO ilas 
10-20-94 AN ATTORNEY AND THE DEFENDANT STATED THAT HE CHOOSES TO ilas 
10-20-94 REPRESENT HIMSELF. THE DEFENDANT DEMANDED A PRELIMINARY HEARINGilas 
10-20-94 AND IT WAS SET FOR DECEMBER 1, 1994 AT 1:30 P.M. THE DEFENDANT ilas 
10-20-94 STATED THAT HE DOES NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, THAT HE DAMANDS ilas 
10-20-94 ALL HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND THAT HE WANTS ilas 
10-20-94 TO BE INDITED BY A GRAND JURY AND NOT BY FILING OF INFORMATION, ilas 
10-20-94 THE COURT AUTHORIZED THE FILING OF THE DEFENDANTS DECLARATION OFilas 
10-20-94 INDEPENDANCE. ilas 
10-21-94 FLD: PUBLICATION OF DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ilas 
10-27-94 FLD: ORDER WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING bis 
11-01-94 FLD: TRANSCRIPT OR TAPE ORDER ilas 
11-01-94 UPDATE: MAILED ORDER FOR TAPE WITH MO FOR $10.00 TO PRICE ilas 
11-25-94 FLD: SUBPOENA WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - DAVID E. CASTLE bis 
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Case No: 941700250 
Date: Mar. 13, 1997 
11-30-94 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on December 01, 1994 at 01:32 PM 
in COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. ilas 
12-01-94 MISCELLEANEOUS FEE Payment Received: 8.00 bis 
Note: TAPE DUPLICATION FEE 
12-01-94 Judge ANDERSON assigned. bis 
12-01-94 Hearing (PRELIMINARY HEARING): JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON ilas 
12-01-94 TAPE: 94-120 COUNT: 6560 ilas 
12-01-94 ATD: Deft pro se PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C. ilas 
12-01-94 Deft Present and pro se ilas 
12-01-94 OSC scheduled for 12/15/94 at 1000 A in room A with LRAilas 
12-01-94 THE STATE'S WITNESS WAS NOT PRESENT. THE COURT ORDERED THE ilas 
12-01-94 CLERK TO PREPARE AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR DECEMBER 15, 1995 ASilas 
12-01-94 TO WHY THE WITNESS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR ilas 
12-01-94 FAILURE TO OBEY A SUBPOENA. THE DEFENDANT MADE A MOTION TO ilas 
12-01-94 DISMISS. THE STATE MADE A MOTION TO POSTPONE THE HEARING AND A ilas 
12-01-94 MOTION TO PAY THE DEFENDANT FOR HIS TRAVEL EXPENSES. THE MOTION ilas 
12-01-94 TO DISMISS WAY DENIED AND THE MOTIONS TO POSTPONE AND PAY TRAVELilas 
12-01-94 EXPENSES WERE GRANTED. THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS SET FOR ilas 
12-01-94 DECEMBER 15, 1994 AT 10:00 A.M. AND THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS ilas 
12-01-94 SET FOR FEBRUARY 16, 1995 AT 1:35 P.M. THE DEFENDANT MADE A ilas 
12-01-94 MOTION CHALLENGING THE COURTS JURISDICTION AND THE COURT ADVISEDilas 
12-01-94 THE DEFENDANT TO MAKE THE MOTION IN WRITING AND TO SUBMIT A ilas 
12-01-94 MOTION FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES IN WRITING ALSO. (CONTINUED ON ilas 
12-01-94 94-121/01) ilas 
12-01-94 FLD: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ilas 
12-01-94 FLD: REQUEST FOR TAPE DUPLICATION bis 
12-05-94 UPDATE: GAVE DOUG HALL OSC TO SO FOR SERVICE ilas 
12-05-94 FLD: SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE WITH ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE/DOUG ilas 
12-05-94 HALLS ilas 
12-05-94 Order to Show Cause scheduled on Decembei n>, IMVM at lu:u0 AM 
in COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. ilas 
12-15-94 Judge ANDERSON assigned. ilas 
12-15-94 Hearing (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE): JUDGfc". LYLE R. ANUERUON bis 
12-15-94 TAPE: 94-130 COUNT: 777 bis 
12-15-94 ATD: None Present PRO: HALLS, CRAIG c bis 
12-15-94 Deft not present bis 
12-15-94 THE CASE WAS BEFORE THE COURT FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR bis 
12-15-94 SARGENT DOUG HALL. SARGENT HALL WAS PRESENT AND THE COURT FINDS bis 
12-15-94 THAT HE IS NOT IN CONTEMPT BUT THAT HE MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE bis 
12-15-94 FOR ALL OR SOME OF THE COSTS OF THE DEFENDANT'S TRAVEL EXPENSES.bis 
01-04-95 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on February 16, 1995 at 01:35 PM 
in COURTROOM 1 with Judge ANDERSON. ilas 
01-12-95 FLD: NOTICE OF RELATED CASE/MOTION TO COMBINE WITH CERTIFICATE bis 
01-12-95 OF MAILING bis 
02-06-95 FLD: MOTION FOR DISCOVERY bis 
02-06-95 FLD: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 5: DRIVING ON SUSPENSION bis 
02-06-95 FLD: SUBPOENA WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - DOUG HALL bis 
02-06-95 FLD: ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGbls 
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Date: Mar. 13, 1997 
02-06-95 FLD: RULING ON MOTION FOR DISCOVERY WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING bis 
02-16-95 FLD: AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID CASTLE ilas 
02-16-95 FLD: AFFIDAVID OF PAULA CASTLE ilas 
02-16-95 Hearing (PRELIMINARY HEARING): JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON bis 
02-16-95 Judge ANDERSON assigned. bis 
02-16-95 TAPE: 95-30 COUNT: 1345 bis 
02-16-95 ATD: Deft pro se PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C. bis 
02-16-95 Deft Present and pro se bis 
02-16-95 THE COURT ANSWERS QUESTIONS FORM DEFENDANT. THE STATE CALLS bis 
02-16-95 SARGENT DOUG HALL WHO WAS SWORN ANDT TESTIFIED. THE STATE CALLS bis 
02-16-95 OFFICER BILL PIERCE WHO WAS SWORN AND TESTIFIED. THE STATE bis 
02-16-95 RESTS. THE DEFENDANT WISHES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF. THE DE- bis 
02-16-95 FENDANT WAS SWORN AND TESTIFIED (CONTINUED 95-31/01). THE bis 
02-16-95 DEFENSE RESTS. THE STATE GIVES CLOSING ARGUMENTS. THE DEFENDANT bis 
02-16-95 GIVES CLOSING ARGUMENTS. THE COURT FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THEbls 
02-16-95 DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED THE CRIMES AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONbls 
02-16-95 AND ORDERS HIM BOUND OVER TO ANSWER THE CHARGES IN DISTRICT bis 
02-16-95 COURT. THE DEFENDANT AGREED TO HAVE HIS ARRAIGNMENT IN DISTRICT bis 
02-16-95 COURT NOW. THE DEFENDANT PLEAD NOT GUILTY AND THE COURT ORDERED bis 
02-16-95 THE PLEAS ENTERED. THE COURT SET THE JURY TRIAL FOR APRIL 3 AND bis 
02-16-95 4, 1995, AT 9:30 AM. bis 
02-16-95 Chrg: 41-6-13.5 Plea: Not Guilty ilas 
02-16-95 Chrg: 41-6-46 Plea: Not Guilty ilas 
02-16-95 Chrg: 76-8-3 05 Plea: Not Guilty ilas 
02-16-95 Chrg: 76-8-309 Plea: Not Guilty ilas 
02-16-95 Chrg: 53-3-227 Plea: Not Guilty ilas 
02-16-95 Chrg: 76-10-504 Plea: Not Guilty ilas 
02-16-95 FLD: JUDICIAL NOTICE DEMAND FOR RIGHTS WITH ATTATCHMENT ilas 
02-16-95 FLD: ORDER ilas 
02-17-95 FLD: PRELIMINARY HEARING LOG SHEET bis 
02-21-95 FLD: RETRACTION OF PLEADING ilas 
03-02-95 FLD: JUDICIAL NOTICE/DEMAND FOR RIGHTS bis 
03-10-95 UPDATE: DEFENDANT CALLED AND SAID THAT HE WANTED COPIES OF THE bis 
03-10-95 TAPES OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. HE IS SENDING $8.00. bis 
03-13-95 MISCELLEANEOUS FEE Payment Received: 8.00 sbm 
Note: RECEIVED THROUGH MAIL 
03-13-95 MISCELLEANEOUS FEE Payment Received: 8.00 sbm 
Note: RECEIVED THROUGH MAIL 
03-15-95 FLD: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE ilas 
03-23-95 FLD: RULING ON MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE W/ CERTIFICATE OF MAILING shell] 
03-23-95 TBD scheduled on April 06, 1995 at 10:00 AM in COURTROOM 1 with 
Judge ANDERSON. shell] 
04-03-95 FLD: MOTION TO CHANGE ORDER WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ilas 
04-04-95 FLD: RESPONSE TO CHANGE ORDER WITH CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ilas 
04-06-95 Hearing: JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON bis 
04-06-95 Judge ANDERSON assigned. bis 
04-06-95 TAPE: 95-38 COUNT: 1680 bis 
04-06-95 ATD: None Present PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C. bis 
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Date: Mar. 13, 1997 
04-06 
04-06 
04-06 
04-06 
04-06 
04-06 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
04-20 
JUDGE: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
PRO: HALLS, CRAIG C. 
-95 Deft not present bis 
-95 HRG scheduled for 04/20/95 at 1000 A in room A with LRAbls 
-95 THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PRESENT AND THE COURT NOTED FOR THE RECORDbls 
-95 THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS CALLED AND THE MATTER WAS CONTINUED TO bis 
-95 APRIL 20, 1995, AT 10:00 AM. THE DEFENDANT WILL APPEAR WITH HIS bis 
-95 ATTORNEY AT THAT TIME. bis 
-95 FLD: RETURN OF SERVICE WITH SUBPOENA/CRAIG HALLS bis 
-95 HEARING scheduled on April 20, 1995 at 10:00 AM in COURTROOM 1 
with Judge ANDERSON. 
•95 Judge ANDERSON assigned. 
•95 Hearing: 
-95 TAPE: 95-41 COUNT: 24 69 
•95 ATD: Deft pro se 
•95 Deft Present and pro se 
•95 THE DEFENDANT WAS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL THAT IS NOT LICENSED IN 
•95 THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THE COURT DISMISSED COUNSEL. THE STATE 
•95 MOVED TO QUASH THE SUBPOENA ISSUED BY DEFENDANT, AND THE DEFEND-bls 
•95 ANT OBJECTED. THE COURT GRANTED THE MOTION BY THE STATE. THE bis 
•95 COURT PASSED THE MATTER TO GIVE DEFEDANT TIME TO DECIDE IF HE bis 
•95 WILL HIRE AN ATTORNEY LICENSED IN THE STATE OF UTAH. RECALLED bis 
•95 95-41/4264 THE DEFENDANT CHOOSES NOT TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY LICEN- bis 
•95 SED IN THE STATE OF UTAH AND REFUSES COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL ANDbls 
•95 ALSO REFUSES AN ATTORNEY TO BE APPOINTED TO STAND BY. THE COURT bis 
•95 SET THE JURY TRIAL FOR JULY 17 & 18, 1995, AT 9:30 AM. THE bis 
•95 COURT INSTRUCTED THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS SEVEN bis 
-95 DAYS PRIOR TO THE TRIAL AND IF DEFENDANT DECIDES TO HIRE COUNSELbls 
95 AN APPEARANCE NEEDS TO BE ENTERED 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE TRIAL. bis 
95 THE COURT ALSO INSTRUCTED THE DEFENDANT THAT IF HE DECIDES TO bis 
95 HAVE STAND BY COUNSEL APPOINTED HE NEEDS TO INFORM THE COURT 2 bis 
95 WEEKS PRIOR TO THE TRIAL AND IF THERE ARE QUESTIONS THE DEFEND- bis 
95 ANT WANTS ASKED TO THE JURY HE SHALL SUBMIT THOSES QUESTION ONE bis 
convert 
convert 
bis 
bis 
bis 
bis 
bis 
bis 
1995 at 09:30 AM in COURTROOM 1 
04-20 
04-27 
06-07 
06-07 
06-12 
06-20 
06-20 
06-26 
06-26 
06-28 
07-03 
07-03 
1995 at 09:30 AM -OURTROOM 1 
95 WEEK PRIOR TO THE TRIAL. 
-95 Jury Trial scheduled on July 17, 
with Judge ANDERSON. 
-95 Jury Trial scheduled on July 18, 
with Judge ANDERSON. 
-95 MISCELLEANEOUS FEE Payment Received: 
Note: TAPE COPY FEE 
-95 FLD: NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTION OF A PORTION OF THE 
-95 PROCEEDINGS 
-95 FLD: ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT 
8.00 
bis 
L 
bis 
bis 
sbm 
ilas 
ilas 
bis 
-95 FLD: STATE OF UTAH, PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH CERTIFICATE ilas 
•95 OF MAILING ilas 
•95 FLD: AMENDED NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTION OF A PORTION OFbls 
•95 THE PROCEEDINGS bis 
-95 FLD: AMENDED ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT ilas 
-95 FLD: LIST OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR JURY DUTY bis 
-95 FLD: NOTICE TO ALL JURORS SERVING bis 
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ADDENDUM VII 
EXCERPTS OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
(R.359-363) 
120 
] 
2 
3 
- I 
5 
6 
7 
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THE COURT: The opinion about 
inaudible) is irrelevant. The objection is 
ustained. 11 doesi I ' t matter Cas 11e 
t hinks (inaudible) - -
MR, CASTLE: of cours e i l o t, We a 1 1 1 : i l ow 
that. 
I would like to approach the witness. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, do not make any 
further side comments to the Members of the Jury. 
I'm directing you and instructing you not to make — 
MR. CASTLE: Can I come up to the 
s 1: a n d ? 
THE COURT: You may approach him and 
present him something — 
MR. CASTLE: I would like (inaudible) --
Q. (BY MR. CASTLE:) Your opinion was that I 
didn't have a right to have the gun? 
A. To have the gun concealed on your person - -
Q. Concealed on --
A. • - or in an automobile. 
Q. -- my person? Okay. Let me have you read 
something here from the Criminal Code of Utah. Would 
you read this, 76-10-504. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, we can take 
judicial notice of the criminal statute that's 
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1 I relevant. I'm not sure this officer reading a 
2 I statute in court is going to do anything. I think 
3 it's — 
4 THE COURT: That's right. I'm going to 
5 instruct the jury about what the law is, and the 
6 defendant has the opportunity to request 
7 instructions --
8 MR. CASTLE: I object because there's a 
9 law here that says I can have — 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Castle --
11 MR. CASTLE: -- a gun. 
12 THE COURT: -- I have ruled that you may 
13 not ask this question of the witness. That's a 
14 matter for jury instructions. 
15 MR. CASTLE: I've seen them and they do 
16 not have this statute in them. This statute — 
17 MR. CASTLE: You have the right to 
18 propose a proper jury instruction, Mr. Castle. 
19 MR. CASTLE: This point is very 
20 pertinent to our difference of opinion. 
21 J THE COURT: Mr. Castle, do not argue 
22 | with me. I have sustained the objection. 
23 | MR. CASTLE: I'd like to show you what I 
24 | would like — may I show you what I would like him to 
25 | read, please? 
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1 | Okay. This, except this, and then 
2 ! THE COURT: The record will note the 
lefendant has proffered a reading of Section 
4 76-10-504, Subsection 1. 
5 MR, CASTLE: Well, but wait. Wait, 
wait, wait. Okay. 
/ i THE COURT: A n d S u b s e c t i o n ] a n :I 1(a). 
8 MR. CASTLE: (inaudible). 
9 THE COURT: And 76-10-(inaudible). 
10 I MR. CASTLE: That's the --
1J I THE COURT: You made your record, 
M r Castle. 
13 I MR. CASTLE: This is literally entitled 
"Position of Weapon Authorized." 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Castle, no further 
16 discussion of those sections. If they're relevant to 
17 the charge, I will instruct the jury with regard to 
18 it. We're not going to argue (inaudible). 
19 MR. CASTLE: Is the law relevant that 
20 says I can't have a gun in my car concealed? 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Castle --
22 J MR. CASTLE: Am I being charged with --
23 | THE COURT: -- no further discussion of 
24 | these statutes. 
25 I MR. CASTLE: I'm being charged with this 
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1 | very thing, and it says right here I --
2 I THE COURT: Mr. Castle, I find you in 
3 contempt of court. Do you have anything to say 
4 before I sentence you? 
5 MR. CASTLE: I demand a jury trial on a 
6 contempt of court charge. 
7 THE COURT: All right. You are not 
8 entitled to a jury trial with that charge. I 
9 sentence you to thirty days in jail. 
10 Members of the Jury, because this has 
11 happened, I'm forced to declare a mistrial in this 
12 case. I'm reluctant to do that because it means your 
13 effort here is wasted. Mr. Castle is not --
14 MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, you're the one 
15 that's in contempt of court. 
16 THE COURT: You're excused, Members of 
17 the Jury. 
18 Bailiff, take the defendant into 
19 custody. Set his arrangement for Thursday, the 20th, 
20 at 10 o'clock a. m. 
21 THE BAILIFF: Would you step out of the 
22 I courtroom, please. 
23 I MR. CASTLE: I move for a stay of 
24 I execution. 
25 | THE COURT: Denied. 
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I'm sorry, Mr. Halls. 
Would you escort the defendant in 
rustody, Mr. Bailiff. 
Declare a mistrial in this case. 
Bring him before the Court on the 20th 
or a rescheduling of the trial. 
(Court adjourned at 2:03 p.m.) 
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ADDENDUM VIII 
RELEASE ORDER (R.169) 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
FILED AUG - 4 1995 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BV 
B E P D T 7 ~ 
Tn The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County 
State of Utah 
Till: STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
DAVID ELLIOTT CASTLE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 9417-250 FS 
Defendant was committed to the San Juan County Jail on J 
17 JL'j'ib, I. serve .. iM *iiy sentence for contempt of court 
August !.„ 1995, defendant will have sex veil i.w* * uub 
sentence. 
Defendant has filed a statement with the court committing to 
be respectful and apologizing for his at MeRs ^n MM ^ourt. 
Defendant also pledged to abide by all lawful orders of the court. 
While this pledge from the defendant falls short of what the law 
requires :I e , compliance with all orders of the rourt that are 
not patently invalid — it represents some progress which the court 
desires to encourage. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the last ten day? .. i defends 
sentence be suspended, on the condition that defendant obey -
orders of the court uid demonstrate respect for the authority of 
1 
the court during all future proceedings. In particular, defendant 
is directed and ordered as follows: 
1. Not to use his opening statement for any purpose other 
than to outline to the jury what defendant expects the evidence to 
show. 
2. Not to make comments to jurors or members of the jury 
during the trial except during opening statements and closing 
arguments. 
3. To accept without argument the rulings of the court on 
the admissibility of the evidence. If defendant wishes to make a 
proffer or to offer more argument, he is to request a conference 
outside the hearing of the jury. 
4. Not to argue or suggest to the jurors that they are free 
to, or should, disregard the court's statement of what the law is, 
or determine that the law should be disregarded. 
5. Not to place material in locations accessible to jurors 
which suggests or argues that the jury has the power to ignore the 
law. 
6. To address all motions contesting the validity of 
statutes under which defendant is charged, and any requests for 
interpretation of the statutes, to the court. 
7. To address the prosecutor as Mr. Halls and the presiding 
judge as Judge or "your honor." 
8. To request jury instructions that are respectful of the 
authority of the court and represent a good faith effort to 
interpret the statute under which defendant is charged and the 
2 
rules governing these proceedings. 
DATED LJifci 411 J a y o t A u g u s t , 1 9 9 5 . 
Nt ici^jM^(S\ 
Distr ic t Court Judge 
Si^nrdluvP s W p laud aj) \pxsi. ^uXx^pU»>nj 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify tiiat I fiaml delivered true diitl correct copies 
the foregoing ORDER, to: 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
297 S. Main 
Monticello, UT 84535 
David Elliott Castle 
San Juan County Jail Inmate 
297 S. Main 
Monticello, UT 84 535 
DATED the *#^ day "I 'UJ«)U,SI , i 
3us ^€)ou^ik 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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